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Causation, Evidence, and Inference
In this book, Reiss argues in favor of a tight fit between evidence, con-
cept, and purpose in our causal investigations in the sciences. There is no
doubt that the sciences employ a vast array of techniques to address causal
questions such as controlled experiments, randomized trials, statistical and
econometric tools, causal modeling and thought experiments. But how do
these different methods relate to each other and to the causal inquiry at
hand? Reiss argues that there is no 鈥榞old standard鈥 in settling causal issues
against which other methods can be measured. Rather, the various methods
of inference tend to be good only relative to certain interpretations of the
word 鈥榗ause鈥? and each interpretation, in turn, helps to address some salient
purpose (e.g., prediction, explanation, or policy analysis) but not others.
The main objective of this book is to explore the metaphysical and method-
ological consequences of this view in the context of numerous cases studies
from the natural and social sciences.
Julian Reiss (PhD 2002, LSE) is Professor of Philosophy at Durham Uni-
versity and Co-Director of the Centre for Humanities Engaging Science and
Society (CHESS). His main research interests are methodologies of the sci-
ences (especially causality and causal inference, models, simulations and
thought experiments, and counterfactuals), philosophy of economics, and
science and values.
Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science
1 Evolution, Rationality and 9 Models, Simulations, and
Cognition Representations
A Cognitive Science for the Paul Humphreys and Cyrille
Twenty-First Century Imbert
Edited by Ant贸nio Zilh茫o
10 Platonism, Naturalism, and
2 Conceptual Systems Mathematical Knowledge
Harold I. Brown
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