(1990sm,Bruno and Fischer,QJE)Seigniorage and high inflation trap英语教案.pdf

Seigniorage, Operating Rules, and the High Inflation Trap Author(s): Michael Bruno and Stanley Fischer Source: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, No. 2 (May, 1990), pp. 353-374 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: /stable/2937791 Accessed: 12/07/2009 10:16 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available at /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at /action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Quarterly Journal of Economics. SEIGNIORAGE, OPERATING RULES, AND THE HIGH INFLATION TRAP* MICHAEL BRUNO AND STANLEY FISCHER There may be both a high and a low inflation equilibrium when the government finances the deficit through seigniorage. Under rational expectations the high inflation equilibrium is stable, and the low inflation equilibrium unstable; unde