8-Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets- An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information英语教案.pdf

Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information Author(s): Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz Source: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Nov., 1976), pp. 629-649 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: /stable/1885326 . Accessed: 17/10/2011 07:04 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use, available at . /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Quarterly Journal of Economics. EQUILIBRIUM IN COMPETITIVE INSURANCE MARKETS: AN ESSAY ON THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION* MICHAEL ROTHSCHILD AND JOSEPH STIGLITZ Introduction, 629.-I. The basic model, 630.-Il. Robustness, 638-III. Conclusion, 648. INTRODUCTION Economic theorists traditionally banish discussions of infor- mation to footnotes. Serious consideration of costs of communication, imperfect knowledge, and the like would, it is believed, complicate without informing. This paper, which analyzes competitive markets in which the characteristics of the commodities exchanged are not fully known to at least one of the parties to the transaction, suggests that this comforting myth is false. Some of the most important con- clusions of economic theory are not robust to considerations