12-redit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Imformation英语教案.pdf

American Economic Association Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information Author(s): Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss Source: The American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jun., 1981), pp. 393-410 Published by: American Economic Association Stable URL: /stable/1802787 . Accessed: 17/10/2011 07:14 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use, available at . /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. American Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Economic Review. CreditRationingin Marketswith ImperfectInformation By JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ AND ANDREW WEISS* Why is credit rationed? Perhaps the most they receive on the loan, and the riskiness of basic tenet of economics is that market equi- the loan. However, the interest rate a bank librium entails supply equalling demand; that charges may itself affect the riskiness of the if demand should exceed supply, prices will pool of loans by either: 1) sorting potential rise, decreasing demand and/or increasing borrowers (the adverse selection effect); or 2) supply until demand and supply are equated affecting the actions of borrowers (the incen- at the new equilibrium price. So if prices do tive effect). Both effects derive directly from their job, rationing should not exist. How- the residual imperfe