11-Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm英语教案.pdf

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Author(s): Eugene F. Fama Source: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 2 (Apr., 1980), pp. 288-307 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: /stable/1837292 . Accessed: 17/10/2011 07:12 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use, available at . /page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Political Economy. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm Eugene F. Fama Universityof Chicago This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security own- ership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. We first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. The entre- preneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur-management and risk bearing-are treated as natu- rally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. Individual partici- pant