完全信息静态博弈.pdf

Chapter 1 完全信息静态博弈 Static Games of Complete Information In this chapter we consider games of the following simple form: first, the players simultaneously choose actions; then, the players receive payoffs that depend on the combination of actions just chosen. Within the class of such static (or simultaneous-move) games,we restrict attention to games of complete information. That is each player’s payoff function (the function that determines the players payoff from the combination of actions chosen by the players) is common knowledge among all the players. 教材P21 一、Normal-Form Representation of Games and Nash Equilibrium (一)Normal-Form Representation of Games In the normal-form representation of a game ,each player simultaneously chooses a strategy, and the combination of strategies chosen by the players determines a payoff for each player. We illustrate the normal-form representation with a classical example—The prisoners’ Dilemma. ＊Two suspects are arrested and charged with a crime. The police lack sufficient evidence to convict the suspects, unless at least one confesses.The police hold the suspects in separate cells and explain the consequences that will follow from the actions they could take. If neither confesses then both will be convicted of a minor offense and sentenced to one year in jail. If both confess then both will be sentenced to jail five years. Finally, if one confesses but the other does not, then the confessor will be released immediately but the other will be sentenced to eight years in jail—five for the crime and a further three for obstructing justice(干扰司法) 。 囚徒２ 招认 沉默 招认 –5, -5 0, -8 囚徒１ 沉默 -8,