3 hybrid plans 混合制.ppt

資料來源：高階經理人薪酬的揭露程度與公司治理-劉念琪(中央大學助理教授)、李思瑩(中央大學碩士) * 資料來源：高階經理人薪酬的揭露程度與公司治理-劉念琪(中央大學助理教授)、李思瑩(中央大學碩士) * The Principal-Agent Problem The analysis of CEO compensation also raises a number of important questions in economics. In particular, what should be the compensation package of a person who runs the firm, yet does not own it? The CEO is an agent for the owners of the firm (the owners are also called the principals). The owners of the firm, who are typically the shareholders, want the CEO to conduct the firm’s business in a way that increases their wealth. * The inevitable conflict between the interests of the principals and the interests of the agent is known as the principal-agent problem. The structure of CEO compensation can be interpreted in terms of a tournament where the vice-presidents compete for promotion, and where the winner runs the company. This interpretation explains why the “prize spread” is larger when executives are promoted to CEO than when executives are promoted from junior to middle-level management. * TOURNAMENTS Firms award promotions on the basis of the relative ranking of the workers. A tournament might be used when it is cheaper to observe the relative ranking of a worker than the absolute level of the worker’s productivity. Workers allocate more effort to the firm when the prize spread between winners and losers in the tournament is very large. A large prize spread, however, also creates incentives for workers to sabotage the efforts of other players or to quit along the way. * THE ALLOCATION OF EFFORTIN A TOURNAMENT The marginal cost curve gives the “pain” of allocating an additional unit of effort to a tournament. If the prize spread between first and second place is large, the marginal revenue to an additional unit of effort is very high (MRHIGH) and the worker allocates more effort to the tournament. Dollars Effort MC MRHIGH Y X MRLOW Fhigh Flow * The Link between CEO Compensation and Firm Performance There is a positive correlati