管理层激励与企业经营业绩相关性研究会计学专业论文.docxVIP

山东财经大 山东财经大学硕士学位论文 Abs Abstract 摘 要 所有权与经营权相分离是现代企业制度的主要特征，股东拥有企业的所有权， 管理层拥有企业的经营权，两者的利益函数并不完全一致。加上信息不对称问题 的存在，导致一系列委托代理问题的产生。管理层激励作为降低企业代理成本， 激发管理层努力工作的手段，成为人们研究的重点。 本文认为管理层激励包括管理层货币薪酬、持股比例与在职消费三方面，从 上市公司的产权基础不同这一独特视角出发，对管理层激励与企业经营业绩的相 关性进行研究。采用规范研究与实证研究相结合的研究方法，选取了 2008—2011 年沪市 A 股制造业上市公司的有关数据作为研究样本，利用 Excel 对数据进行初 步的整理，并将其按照产权性质进行了分组，以研究不同产权基础下管理层激励 与企业经营业绩之间的关系。研究结果表明，上市公司管理层货币薪酬、持股比 例与企业经营业绩呈正相关关系，管理层的在职消费与企业经营业绩呈负相关关 系，并且非国有控股上市公司的代理效率要高于国有控股上市公司的代理效率。 本文的研究可能会为完善不同产权基础上市公司管理层激励机制提供一些经验 证据，在不同的产权基础下，管理层激励方式、管理层激励结构与企业经营业绩 的相关程度是不同的，这应该是之后的研究要予以高度重视的。 关键词：产权基础 货币薪酬 管理层持股比例 在职消费 企业经营业绩 i PAGE PAGE iv Abstract Ownership and operation separate is the main characteristic of modern enterprise system, shareholders have the ownership of enterprise, managers have the right of management, and their interests are not consistent. Besides the problem of asymmetric information, a series of principal-agent problem appeared. Managers incentive as the way to reduce agency costs, motivate managers to hard work, become the focus of people’s research. This paper argues that manager incentive include three aspects: monetary compensation, share proportion held by management, and on-the-job consumption. From this unique perspective that the listed companies based on different property rights we can research the relationship between management incentive and corporate performance. The research use the methods that combine normative research with empirical research, select manufacturing listed companies’ data in SSE A market from 2008-2011 as the research sample, using Excel to collation those data simply, and then the data is grouped into different property rights, after that we can research the relationship between management incentive and enterprise business performance based on different property rights. After the research we can see that the relationship between management monetary compensation, Managerial stockholding level and corporate performance is positively correlated,