关键词拍卖的排序规则分析-情报学专业论文.docxVIP

华 华 中 科 技 大 学 硕 士 学 位 论 文 II II Abstract As the rapid growing and application of search engine technology, keyword advertisement has become the principal revenue source of search engine companies such as Google, Baidu, etc. Keyword auction is the sale mechanism of keyword advertisement, which is different from the traditional sale mechanism CPM (Cost Per Mile). Keyword auction is the extension of classic auction mechanisms, and its mechanism has changed from GFP (Generalized First Pricing) to GSP (Generalized Second Pricing). As truth telling is not the dominant strategy in GSP, many researchers are interested in the research of advertisers’ bidding strategy, equilibrium analysis and mechanism design in keyword auction. Based on the former researches, I focus on the research of ranking rules in keyword auction. From the angle of search engine companies, I use Monte-Carlo simulation to compare the search engine revenue, user experience and efficiency in different ranking rules based on the distributions derived from the empirical data. I also take the long-term influence of ranking rules into consideration and classify the simulation into two categories, namely short-term and long-term. In the short-term situation or long-term situation with only the influence on advertiser number, search engine revenue arrives its maximum value when ranking according to bid. And in the long-term situation with only the influence on natural CTR (Click Through Rate) or both the influence on advertiser number and natural CTR, search engine revenue increases as the weight of quality score increases. We can conclude from the simulation results that the way advertiser number influences on search engine revenue is different from that of natural CTR, and my research outcome can give search engine companies some instructions when they make decisions about ranking rules. Keywords：Keyword Auction; Search Engines; Ranking Rules; Short-term Revenue; Long-term Revenue III III 目 录 摘 要 I Abst