Equity Concentration, Executive Equity Incentive and Firm Performance 股权集中度、高管股权激励和公司绩效.pdf

2017 2nd International Conference on Humanities Science, Management and Education Technology (HSMET 2017) ISBN: 978-1-60595-494-3 Equity Concentration, Executive Equity Incentive and Firm Performance —Based on Merger Enterprise Sample Data Xiuwen Lan and Haiyu Zhang Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics (Hohhot, Inner Mongolia，010070，China) Key words: Equity Concentration Executive, Equity Incentive Enterprise Performance, M A Enterprise Abstract: In the context of the separation of the two powers, there is principal-agent problems, managers and owners can not be completely consistent on the interests of the target, so improve the companys incentive mechanism and give executives a certain equity incentive, can produce a role in / of / as the final decision on corporate mergers and acquisitions behavior and the number of mergers and acquisitions, quality and long-term performance of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, this paper chooses M A enterprises as the basic sample, and studies the influence of executive equity incentive on the long-term business performance of the enterprise based on the different ownership concentration degree, and according to the stock ownership concentration criterion carries on the grouping return, that has a certain practical significance to perfect the enterprise equity incentive mechanism and improve the acquisition long-term performance of enterprises. 1. Introduction In the context of the separation of the two powers, there is information asymmetry and principal-agent problem. So it is an important problem to modernize corporate governance of the goal of maximizing busines