该公司的声誉激励的承包和使用外文翻译.doc

该公司的声誉激励的承包和使用外文翻译 外文题目 The use of incentive contracting and firm reputation 外文出处Corporate Reputation Review,2010(4):P8-18 外文作者 David A. Volkman Kath Henebry 原文: The Use of Incentive Contracting and Firm Reputation While corporations have increased the use of incentive contracting, they have simultaneously expressed increased interest in maintaining or improving the reputation of their firm. This research demonstrates that the two goals may be incongruous, that, in contrast to previous research, the use of incentive contracting may not align the interests of management and sales staff and may expose the corporation to increased reputation risk. Specifically, we incorporate Finnerty ’s 2005 compensation model into a multilevel asymmetric information model and demonstrate that a salesperson ’s incentive to increase reputational risk by misrepresenting the product or service of the firm is a function of the existence of asymmetric information between the salesperson and the customer, for example customer knowledge base, the inability of management to monitor a salesperson ’ s actions, the lack of a timely penalty for a salesperson ’ s aberrant actions, and the relative level of salesperson ’ s commission to base compensation. Previous research evaluating the affect of incentive contracting on a sales staff ’ s behavior have generally concluded that commissions will attenuate the shirking behavior but may lead to divergent risk-seeking behavior. This research extends previous analysis into the efficacy of incentive contracting by first recognizing the need to model multi levels of asymmetric information and the threat of termination; then delineating the environments whereby incentive contracting leads to perverse risk-seeking behavior by the firm s sales staff. While asymmetric information between the managers and employees of a firm is fundamental to the agency problems of shirking and risk seeking, the assumption is not sufficient