治理机制与企业价值股权集中度和红利的影响.doc

本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 原文： Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value: The Impact of Ownership Concentration and Dividends Over the last three decades, the idea of independent directors has become important, particularly with stock market regulators and many corporate governance advocates (Farrar, 2001). Indeed, financial economists generally suggest that the representation of independent directors on boards increases the effectiveness of boards in monitoring managers and exercising control on behalf of shareholders (e.g., Fama Jensen, 1983;Weisbach, 1988). The most widely discussed question regarding board composition is therefore whether having more independent directors on the board enhances firm performance. A number of studies have been conducted in the US on this issue. For example, a study by Baysinger and Butler(1985) found that the proportion of independent directors was positively correlated with accounting measures of performance. In contrast, Bhagat and Black(2001), Hermalin and Weisbach(1991), and Klein(1998) have found that a higher percentage of independent directors on the board does not have a significant impact on accounting measures of firm performance. A study by Agrawal and Knoeber(1996) show that the proportion of independent directors has a negative relationship to market measures of performance. Conflicting evidence on a direct relationship between board composition and firm performance has also been reported from Australia. Lawrence and Stapledon(1999) found that independent directors do not appear to have added value to firms in the period 1985-1995. A similar result is reported by Cotter and Silvester(2003), who examine the largest 200 companies in 1997. In contrast, Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan(2004) reported that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board leads to stronger firm performance. Why are the findings on the relationship between board composition and firm performance inconclusive? One possible explanation is that most of