关于休谟问题的╲〞解决╲〞.doc

PAGE PAGE 2 关于休谟问题的“解决” ??金岳霖与罗素、莱欣巴赫归纳思想之比较 陈晓平 摘　要 金岳霖先生对著名的休谟问题亦即归纳法的合理性问题给出一种独到的解决，其解决方案的核心是论证归纳原则是永真的。金岳霖对于归纳原则的永真性实际上持有两种不同的理解。一种理解是着眼于归纳结论的或然性上，即结论的或然性使它免于经验的证伪。这种“永真性”与罗素关于归纳原则的“先验性”十分接近，然而，在笔者看来，这样的永真性和先验性没有多大意义，因为反归纳原则即“如果at1—btb，……，atn—btn则大概A?B”也具有这样的性质。 另一种理解是着眼于归纳原则的渐近性上，即归纳过程是引导我们逼近真理的最佳方法，尽管它并不保证我们得到真理。在这种意义上，归纳原则的“永真性”实际上是指归纳原则作为逼近真理之工具的最佳性；确切地说，归纳原则只具有实用上的合理性，而不具有永真性。尽管如此，它对解决休谟问题即归纳法的合理性问题是有着深远意义的。 从金岳霖关于归纳法的整个论述来看，他更看重第二种“永真性”，因此，他对休谟问题的解决更为接近莱欣巴赫而不是罗素，尽管他从未提及莱欣巴赫的归纳理论。可以说，金岳霖所谓的“归纳意念”与莱欣巴赫所谓的“渐近认定”是异曲同工、不谋而合的。只不过，莱欣巴赫的归纳理论更为精致和系统一些。 Abstract Mr. Jin Yuelin gave an original solution of the famous Hume’s problem, i.e., the problem of rationality of induction. The core of his solution is to argue that the principle of induction is always true. Jin Yuelin held actually two different understanding about the permanent truth of induction. One is to stress the probability of inductive conclusion, which have the conclusion is free of the falsification of experience. The ‘permanent truth’ is close to Russell’s ‘apriority’ of induction. However, in my opinion, this kind of permanent truth or apriority doesn’t have any important sense since the principle of anti-induction, i.e.,‘if at1—btb，……，atn—btn then probably A?B’, has the same property. The other understanding is to stress the asymptoticity of the principle of induction, i.e., the inductive process is the best method for us to approach the truth though it doesn’t guarantee us to reach the truth. In this meaning, the permanent truth of induction is actually the optimum as the instrument to approach the truth, more exactly, the principle of induction only has practical rationality but not the permanent truth. On this kind of rationality of induction, Jin Yuelin happen to hold the same view with Reichenbach who proposed the method of asymptotic posit. Comparatively speaking, Reichenbach’s theory of induction is more precise and systematic. In view of his whole theory of induction, Jin Yuelin payed m