所有权的新方法和国有企业的财务控制战略.doc

PAGE 原文： The Chinese governments new approach to ownership and financial control of strategic state-owned enterprises Introduction Despite three decades of economic reforms in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), restructuring of large state-owned enterprise groups has proceeded at a slow pace in recent years. While a variety of different measures and reform models have been tried since the 1980s, these have mostly been half-hearted or unsuccessful. The founding of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003 marks a new phase in efforts to deal with the outstanding challenges and unresolved problems of Chinas state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The founding of SASAC launched a process of redefining the relationship between central government and the so-called central enterprises – the key SOEs that have been selected by the government to form the basis from which Chinas future top global companies will be created. Central enterprises account for the bulk of SOE profits and around a quarter of SOE corporate investment. This paper reviews recent legal and policy changes and case studies that illuminate the changes in this relationship, focusing on the issues of state ownership and state financial control over SOEs. The research question we ask is: to what extent and through what arrangements does the Chinese central government intend to maintain ownership and financial control of the central enterprises? The Chinese governments commitment to the market versus the state has fluctuated over the course of the reform period. In the planned economy, state-owned enterprises were an integral part of the state budgeting system, with all their financing needs being covered by the state, and with profits and losses directly included in the state budget. In the late 1970s, more than half the budget revenues came from state-owned enterprises. The low incentives provided to SOE managers in this system led the government to experim