数字平台和反托拉斯.pdf

0 2 0 DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND 2 R E B M ANTITRUST E V O N 3 2 | GEOFFREY PARKER, GEORGIOS PETROPOULOS AND MARSHALL VAN ALSTYNE 6 0 E U Digital platforms are at the heart of online economic activity, connecting multi- S S sided markets of producers and consumers of various goods and services. Their I | market power and their privileged ecosystem positions raise concerns that they R E may engage in anti-competitive practices that reduce innovation and consumer P A welfare. This paper deals with the role of market competition and regulation in P G addressing these concerns. Traditional (ex-post) antitrust intervention will be less N I effective in markets driven by network effects unless it is combined with a proper K R (ex-ante) regulatory framework. Antitrust tools should focus on value creation O W and its distribution before focusing on competition. The scope of regulatory intervention should satisfy three criteria: i) value creation from operation of the platforms does not decrease due to the policy intervention; in particular, interventions should not reduce network effects; ii) allocative efficiency is based on distributing the value created in a fair way among market participants e.g. use of the Shapley Value. Fair and transparent rules must govern the platform ecosystem; iii) dynamic efficiency and competition ensure that incentives for market misconduct and anticompetitive strategies such as artificial entry