欧盟防务：跨大西洋安全的新出路.docxVIP

Contents  1 Introduction and summary 8 The history of U.S. policy toward European defense integration 17 The current structural problems plaguing European defense 33 A new U.S. approach is needed toward European defense 43 Conclusion 43 About the authors 44 Endnotes Introduction and summary fte state of European defense is not strong. fte level of Europe’s defense spending and the size of its collective forces in uniform should make it a global power with one of the strongest militaries in the world. But Europe does not act as one on defense, even though it formed a political union almost 30 years ago. Europe’s military strength today is far weaker than the sum of its parts. ftis is not just a European failure; it is also fundamentally a fail- ure of America’s post-Cold War strategy toward Europe—a strategy that remains virtually unchanged since the 1990s. Europe’s dependence on the United States for its security means that the United States possesses a de facto veto on the direction of European defense. Since the 1990s, the United States has typically used its effective veto power to block the defense ambitions of the European Union. ftis has frequently resulted in an absurd situation where Washington loudly insists that Europe do more on defense but then strongly objects when Europe’s political union—the European Union— tries to answer the call. ftis policy approach has been a grand strategic error— one that has weakened NATO militarily, strained the trans-Atlantic alliance, and contributed to the relative decline in Europe’s global clout. As a result, one of America’s closest partners and allies of first resort is not nearly as powerful as it could be. European militaries have now experienced decades of decline. Today, much of Europe’s military hardware is in a shocking state of disrepair. Too many of Europe’s forces aren’t ready to fight. Its fighter jets and helicopters aren’t ready to fly; its ships and submarines aren’t ready to sail; and its vehicle