现代——现象学课件.pptx

西方哲学中的身体问题：从现象学的身体-主体;现象学（1）：萨特; 现象学的身体难题： 从《观念2》开始;（1）“man as nature” / “man as spirit” constitution of the natural reality, man (or animal being) the constitution of man as he presents himself to a naturalistic point of view: as material body upon which are constructed new strata of being, the Bodily-psychic.; § 36. Constitution of the Body as bearer of localized sensations (sensings) We have seen that in all experience of spatio-thingly Objects, the Body “ is involved” as the perceptual organ of the experiencing subject, and now we must investigate the constitution of this Corporeality. （1）身体的二元性：内在/外在， 精神/物质， 自我/ 对象 …… ; (2) 身体的二元性：主动/被动 We can thereby choose immediately the special case in which the spatially experienced body, perceived by means of the Body, is the Corporeal body itself. But now there is a distinction between the visual appearances and the tactual regarding, e.g., a hand. ; （3） 触觉之环： 身体-主体之谜 * If I speak of the physical thing, “ left hand,” then I am abstracting from these sensations * If I do include them, then it is not that the physical thing is now richer, but instead it becomes Body, it senses.;Hence the Body is originally constituted in a double way: * first, it is a physical thing, matter; it has its extension, in which are included its real properties, its color, smoothness, hardness, warmth, and whatever other material qualities of that kind there are.; * Secondly, I find on it, and I sense “ on ” it and “ in ” it: warmth on the back of the hand, coldness in the feet, sensations of touch in the fingertips. Moving my hand over the table, I get an experience of it and its thingly determinations.;第二章的开始部分： 提出问题 （1） 身体的难题，无可化解的二元性： “我的为我的身体” “为他的我的身体”; 萨特的核心结论： ; （1）从笛卡尔的二元性转向“我们与自在的原始关系”： ; （2）