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9 - * 9.10 Conclusions Accounting policies (even without cash flow effects) can have economic consequences but securities markets can still be efficient Role of net income in monitoring and motivating manager performance equally important as informing investors Net income competes with share price as a performance measure Role of GAAP in controlling earnings management Note to Pearson: Update copyright in Figure 9.1 * Copyright ? 2012 Pearson Canada Inc 9 - * Financial Accounting TheorySixth EditionWilliam R. ScottChapter 9 An Analysis of Conflict 9 - * Chapter 9An Analysis of Conflict 9.2 Game Theory Models a conflict situation between rational players Number of players More than 1 Few enough that each player takes the actions of other players into account Types of games Cooperative Binding agreement Non-cooperative No binding agreement 9 - * 9 - * 9.3.1 A Single-Period Non-Cooperative Game Table 9.1 UTILITY PAYOFFS IN A NON-COOPERATIVE GAME Manager HONEST (H) DISTORT (D) BUY (B) 60, 40 20, 80 Investor REFUSE TO BUY (R) 35, 20 35, 30 Continued 9 - * A Single-Period Non-Cooperative Game (continued) Nash equilibrium solution RD: payoffs 35,30 Cooperative solution BH: payoffs 60, 40 Single play of the game Why is BH unlikely? Multiple plays: BH more likely Manager reputation and ethical behaviour Folk theorem 9.3.2 A Multi-Period Game (optional section) Example 9.2 A 5-period game If parties do not trust each other, game unravels to single-period If parties trust each other, game continues with probabilities shown. Note: trust is not complete but depends on difference between a player’s expected payoff from continuing and payoff from ending the game How is trust maintained? Ethics Legal liability GAAP 9 - * 9 - * 9.4 Agency Theory A principal wants to hire an agent for some specialized task Assume single-period, for simplicity Agency models separation of
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