银行监管经济学剖析.pptx

Chapter11. EconomicAnalysisofBankRegulationAsymmetricInformation?

Ineconomics,peoplerespondtoincentivesregulationneededtocounteract sometimes,regulationcreatesthewrongincentives

I. AsymmetricInformation bankssolvesomeasymmetricinfoproblemsbutcreatesothers regulationdealswithasymmetricinfoproblemsbutcreatesothers

A. DepositInsuranceFDICestablished1934 preventsdepositorsfrompanickingandwithdrawingfunds“runonthebank”

2typesofactionpayoffmethodFDICclosesdowninsolventbankdepositorspaidupto$100,000FDICsellsoffassetsoftendepositorswithmorethan$100,000oftengivenfullrefund

purchaseassumptionmethod FDICfindsahealthybanktobuyfailingbank--FDICoffersincentivesnodepositorlossesmorecommonmethod

beforeFDICbankpanics1819,1837,1857,1873,1884,1893,1907,1930-33afterFDICnonationalbankpanics

Problemsw/depositinsurancemoralhazard insurancegiveslessincentivetobecareful depositorslesscarefulinselectingbank bankslesscarefulwithdepositormoney

adverseselectionifdepositorsnotpolicingbanks,questionablepeople,knowingthis,attractedtobanking

FDICpoliciesmakeproblemsworse“toobigtofail” FDICgivespreferentialtreatmenttolargerbankfailures--coveringdeposits$100,000--preventlargelosses moralhazard/adverseselectionworseforlargerbanks

B. CapitalRequirementscapitalas%assetscounteractmoralhazardproblemscapitalislostiffailurecapitalreducesrisk-takingwell-capitalizedbankslesssupervisionlowerdepositinsurancepremiums

C. BankSupervisionlimitingownershipbankexaminationsassetriskbankloanscapitalrequirementmanagingrisk

disclosurefinancialstatementsconsumerprotectiontermsofcreditfeedisclosure discrimination“redlining”

competitionrestricteduntil1990s--McFaddenAct--GlassSteagallincreaseshealthofbanks--driving“bad”banksout--increasingefficiency

II. BankingCrisisofthe1980s1934-80lessthan20banksfailureperyear1983-