薪酬管理外文文献翻译.pdfVIP

薪酬管理外文文献翻译

Theexitenceofanagencyprobleminacorporationduetotheeparationof

ownerhipandcontrolhabeenwidelytudiedinliterature.Thipaperexamine

theeffectofmanagementcompenationchemeoncorporateinvetment

deciion.Thipaperiignificantbecaueithelptoundertandtherelationhip

betweenthem.Thiundertandingallowthedeignofanoptimalmanagement

compenationchemetoinducethemanagertoacttowardthegoalandbet

interetofthecompany.GromanandHart(1983)invetigatetheprincipal

agencyproblem.Sincetheactionoftheagentareunobervableandthefirt

betcoureofactioncannotbeachieved,GromanandHarthowthat

optimalmanagementcompenationchemehouldbeadoptedtoinducethe

managertochooetheecondbetcoureofaction.Beidemanagement

compenationcheme,othermeantoalleviatetheagencyproblemarealo

explored.FamaandJenen(1983)uggettwowayforreducingtheagency

problem:competitivemarketmechanimanddirectcontractualproviion.

Manne(1965)arguethatamarketmechanimuchathethreatofatakeover

providedbythemarketcanbeuedforcorporatecontrol.Ex-potettlingup

bythemanageriallabourmarketcanalodiciplinemanagerandinducethem

topuruetheinteretofhareholder.Fama(1980)howthatifmanagerial

labourmarketfunctionproperly,andifthedeviationofthefirmactual

performancefromtockholderoptimumiettledupinmanager

compenation,thentheagencycotwillbefullybornebytheagent(manager).

ThetheoreticalargumentofJenenandMeckling(1976)andHaugenand

Senbet(1981),andempiricalevidenceofAmihudandLev(1981),Walkingand

Long(1984),AgrawalandMandelker(1985),andBenton(1985),amongother,

uggetthatmanagerholdingofcommontockandtockoptionhavean

importanteffectonmanagerialincentive.Fo