93shielding trusted ips socs93在中屏蔽不受信任.pdfVIP

ShieldingNon-TrustedIPsinSoCs

FestusHategekimana,TaylorWhitaker,MdJubaerHossainPantho,ChristopheBobda

CSCEDepartment,UniversityofArkansas

Fayetteville,Arkansas,USA

{fhategek,txw043,mpantho,cbobda}@

—Thispaperexplorestheuseofhardwaresand-onlyallowableinteractions;(2)itcontainsthedamagefrom

boxes,conceptuallysimilartosoftwaresandboxes,forsecurepotentialmaliciouscomponents;(3)itenforcesauthorized

integrationofnon-trustedIPsinsystems-on-chip(SoC)designs.dataaccessibility.Weevaluatedthesecurityperformance

Thegoalofthehardwaresandboxistoonlyallowpermissible

interactionsbetweentheIPandtherestofthesystem.Theoftheproposedsandboxdesignthroughaprototypeimple-

hardwaresandboxdesignachievesthisbyexposingtheIPmentationofTLS/SSLapplicationonaZynqFPGASoC.

interfacetoisolatedvirtualresourcesandcheckingIPsignals’TheapplicationusesTrojan-carryingthirdpartyIPcoresto

“correctnessatrun-time.Weevaluatedthehardwaresandboximplementitscryptographicfunctions.Theresultsshowour

througharealworlddesignimplementation.Oursandboxcanproposedsandboxdesignachievesan87.5%detectionrate

detectamajorityofTrust-HTrojanbenchmarkswitha

negligibleincreaseinresourceoverhead.onaTrust-HubTrojanbenchmarksubsetwithanegligible

increaseinresourceoverhead.

Keywords-Systems-on-Chip(SoC),Trojan,Hardwaresand-

box,SecureExecution,ComponentAuthenticationProcessII.PREVIOUSWORK