信息不对称的市场.ppt

MarketSignalingSignalingWithEducationtoReduceAsymmetricInformationy=educationindex(yearsofhighereducation)C=costofattainingeducationallevelyGroupI--CI(y)=$40,000yGroupII--CII(y)=$20,000yMarketSignalingSignalingWithEducationtoReduceAsymmetricInformationAssumeeducationdoesnotincreaseproductivityDecisionRule:y*signalsGIIandwage=$20,000Belowy*signalsGIandwage=$10,000SignalingYearsofCollegeValueofCollegeEduc.0$100KValueofCollegeEduc.YearsofCollege1234560123456$200K$100K$200KGroupIGroupIICI(y)=$40,000yHowmucheducationshouldapersonobtain?Theeducationdecisionisbasedonbenefits/costparison.B(y)B(y)y*y*B(y)=increaseinwageassociatedwitheachlevelofeducationCII(y)=$20,000yOptimalchoiceofyforGroupISignalingYearsofCollegeYearsofCollegeValueofCollegeEduc.0$100KValueofCollegeEduc.1234560123456$200K$100K$200KCI(y)=$40,000yB(y)B(y)y*y*Benefits=$100,000CostCI(y)=40,000y$100,000$40,000y*y*2.5ChoosenoeducationCII(y)=$20,000yOptimalchoiceofyforGroupIBenefits=$100,000CostCII(yO)=20,000y$100,000$20,000y*y*5Choosey*Decisionruleworksify*isbetween2.5and5Ify*=4GroupIwouldchoosenoschoolGroupIIwouldchoosey*RulediscriminatescorrectlyCost/BenefitComparisonSignalingSignalingEducationdoesincreaseproductivityandprovidesausefulsignalaboutindividualworkhabits.WorkingintotheNightQuestionHowcanyousignaltoyouremployeryouaremoreproductive?SignalingtoidentifyhighqualityanddependabilityEffectivedecisiontoolbecausethecostofwarrantiestolow-qualityproducersistoohigh12GuaranteesandWarrantiesMarketSignalingMoralHazardMoralhazardoccurswhentheinsuredpartywhoseactionsareunobservedcanaffecttheprobabilityormagnitudeofapaymentassociatedwithanevent.MoralHazardDeterminingthePremiumforF